In what document does the program manager pm address the demilitarization?
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Chapter 8, End-Use Monitoring (EUM), describes the Golden Sentry EUM plan and procedures for routine and enhanced EUM of defense articles and services provided by the USG to partner nations. It includes procedures for assisting countries in fulfilling Department of State (DoS) requirements prior to retransfers, changes of end-use, or disposals, and for verifying appropriate demilitarization requirements. Show Section Title C8.1. C8.2. C8.3. C8.4. C8.5. C8.6. C8.7. C8.8. C8.1. - Definition and Purpose Of End-Use Monitoring C8.1.1. The Golden Sentry EUM program is designed to verify that defense articles or services transferred by the United States Government (USG) to foreign recipients are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement or other applicable agreement. In accordance with Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 U.S.C. 2314), as amended, and the Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and Section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2754) of the Arms Export Control Act, and as reflected in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms and Conditions, recipients must agree to use U.S.-provided defense articles, training, and services only for their intended purpose; not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or related training to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or of the USG without prior written consent of the USG; to maintain the security of any article with substantially the same degree of protection afforded to it by the USG; and to permit observation and review by, and to furnish necessary information to, representatives of the USG with regards to use of such articles. EUM provides USG oversight to ensure these conditions are met. All potential end-use violations must be reported through DoS channels. Information regarding any potential violations should also be forwarded to the Golden Sentry program team at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA) Assistance and Monitoring Programs (AMP)), the appropriate Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) (CCDR), and the appropriate U.S. Military Department (MILDEP). Table C8.T1. End-Use Monitoring Legal and Policy References Reference Subject AECA, Section 40A (22 U.S.C. 2785) Requires EUM of defense articles and services sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or the FAA. AECA, Section 38(g)(7) (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(7) Establishes standards for identifying high-risk exports for end-use verification. AECA, Section 3(g), Section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2753(g) and 22 U.S.C. 2754) Requires agreements for the sale or lease of articles on the United States Munitions List (USML) (made after November 29, 1999) to state that the USG retains the right to verify credible reports that the article(s) has been used for purposes not authorized under AECA, section 3. FAA, Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314) Requires Recipient agreement to use the materiel/services properly; return net proceeds from sales as required; and permit observation of the end-use of articles, services, and training. DoD Issuance 2030.08 Implementation of Trade Security Controls (TSC) for Transfers of DoD U.S. Munitions List (USML) and Commerce Control List (CCL) Personal Property to Parties Outside DoD Control. DoD Issuance 4140.66 Registration and End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and/or Services. DoD 4160.28-M Defense Demilitarization Manual
DoD Manual 5100.76-M Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. C8.2 - Golden Sentry C8.2.1. Section 40A of the AECA (22 U.S.C 2785) requires the President to establish an EUM program to improve accountability with respect to defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or FAA. The Director, DSCA, has been delegated authority by the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense, Policy (USD(P)) to administer DoD’s Golden Sentry EUM program, to comply with Section 40A of the AECA. Section 40A requires the EUM program be designed to provide reasonable assurance, to the extent practicable, that the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the USG with respect to the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and defense services. The program must also provide for the end-use verification of defense articles and services that incorporate sensitive technology, and/or are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or whose diversion or other misuse could have significant consequences. Congress requires an annual report describing actions taken to implement Section 40A , including a detailed accounting of the costs and number of personnel associated with the monitoring program. C8.2.2. Golden Sentry’s objective is to ensure compliance with technology control requirements in order to minimize security risks to the United States, partner nations, and Allies. EUM includes all actions to prevent misuse or unauthorized transfer of defense articles or services from title transfer until disposal. The type of defense article or service generally determines the level of monitoring required. The Director, DSCA, may also determine, in consultation at the General Officer, Flag Officer, or Senior Executive Service (SES) level, that a change in physical security and accountability monitoring may be warranted after considering the specific defense article or service in question and based on assessment of the threat to security in the area or for other compelling reasons. When changing events or other unusual circumstances prompt Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO) concern regarding the end-use and security of U.S.-provided defense articles and services, SCOs should contact DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA)) to obtain further guidance. SCO requests for modification in physical security and accountability monitoring must be formally submitted in writing and endorsed by the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) prior to being forwarded to DSCA. C8.2.3. EUM Responsibilities. Monitoring the use of U.S.-origin items is a joint responsibility of the partner nations and the USG, to include the Military Departments (MILDEPs), the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and the SCOs. USG representatives have full responsibility for defense articles until title is transferred to the partner nation. The partner nation assumes this responsibility for transferred items based on the terms under which the transfers are made, including restrictions on physical security and accountability. USG representatives retain a continuing responsibility under Golden Sentry to assist DSCA to verify the appropriate end-use and security of U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services sold or transferred on a government-to-government basis. llists the EUM responsibilities for various DoD organizations. Table C8.T2. DoD End-Use Monitoring Responsibilities Organization Responsibility DSCA (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Assistance & Monitoring Division (IOPS/GEX/AMD))
MILDEPs and Implementing Agencies (IAs)
Additionally:
Combatant Commands (CCMD)
Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) (including Defense Attaché Offices and U.S. Diplomatic Missions with Security Assistance responsibilities)
Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU)
C8.2.4. Post-delivery Monitoring. Post-delivery monitoring is performed by USG personnel assigned to SCOs or deployed to the partner nation in support of SCO functions. The Golden Sentry program employs two post-delivery monitoring methodologies to perform DoD’s EUM responsibilities: Routine and Enhanced EUM (REUM and EEUM, respectively). To assist SCOs in conducting post-delivery monitoring of both types, an EUM application is available in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP-EUM) as a repository of data, to record REUM and EEUM checks, and as a means to generate reports. SCOs must develop EUM Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to implement country-specific EUM policy and procedures. A copy of the SOP must be forwarded to [email protected]. Written SOPs must contain at a minimum the following information: Table C8.T3. SOP Minimum Information Requirements # SOP Minimum Information Requirements 1 EUM responsibilities and procedures for conducting Routine and Enhanced-EUM (EEUM). 2 Partner nation EUM points of contact and procedures for coordinating and conducting EUM-related visits. 3 Procedures for conducting timely physical security checks of the storage facilities and inventories of EEUM-designated defense articles and services in accordance with DoD GS EEUM checklists; use of the SCIP-EUM database to track inventories and maintain an accurate disposition of EEUM-designated items; maintenance of records of Routine and Enhanced EUM checks (by using DoD GS EEUM checklists); and notifying the partner nation of all EEUM checks performed for information and/or corrective action. 4 Procedures for maintaining an accurate baseline of EEUM-designated items transferred to the partner nation as per the EEUM Reconciliation Report provided in the SCIP-EUM) database, and obtaining partner nation reports of losses, firings/expenditures, or disposal of all EEUM-designated defense articles. 5 Procedures for verifying the demilitarization and disposal of EEUM-designated items; reporting inventories, losses, theft, unauthorized access, third party transfers/disposal/damaged/expended defense articles, and possible violations. 6 Procedures for capturing and submitting to the CCMD and DSCA actual costs and projected FMF Administrative funding required to perform EEUM functions. C8.3. - Routine EUM C8.3.1. Routine EUM (REUM) is required for all defense articles and services provided via government-to-government programs. SCO personnel are required to observe and report to the CCMD, DSCA, and DoS any potential misuse or unapproved transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles. SCO personnel should perform REUM checks at every available opportunity in conjunction with other security cooperation functions, during visits to the partner nation’s installations, through interaction with other assigned embassy personnel, and from any other readily available or opportune source of information. SCOs must conduct REUM checks at least quarterly, and must document all REUM checks in the SCIP-EUM database using the REUM check entry form available on the Routine EUM page. C8.3.1.1. To assist SCOs in conducting REUM checks, DSCA has developed an FMS REUM Summary Report located in the SCIP-EUM database under the Queries/Reports menu. This report provides a list of specific categories of defense articles exported via FMS that includes, but is not limited to: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, warships and military vessels, missiles and missile systems, military vehicles, bombs, crew served and individual weapons, and night vision systems. To assist SCOs in electronically documenting REUM checks performed, DSCA developed a REUM template located in the SCIP-EUM database under the Support-Policy/Procedures Memos. C8.3.2. Articles or Services Requiring Additional Controls on End-Use. There are instances in which particular items normally subject to Routine EUM are transferred with notes restricting the conditions under which they may be transported, stored, or employed. SCOs should be aware of these restrictions and alert to indications or reports that suggest failure to comply. C8.3.2.1. Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E). AA&E items require special protection and security measures. The DoD applies stringent AA&E controls while these items are in U.S. custody, and the same standards must be applied to the items upon release to the purchaser. During Case Development, Implementing Agencies should assess secure transportation and distribution options that support customer preferences. A detailed Transportation Plan is required by DoD prior to delivery of the materiel. Once approved, a Transportation Plan becomes an integral part of the LOA and is available for review by U.S. Customs and security officials. Although recipient countries generally do not assume control of sensitive AA&E items within the continental United States, except as cargo loaded and prepared for departure, USG security standards must apply throughout the lifecycle of the weapon system (e.g., transportation, delivery, testing, operational use, storage, and destruction processes). Additionally, a site survey may be required to ensure that appropriate physical security measures are in place at the destination prior to the delivery of the weapon systems. See DoD 5100.76-M, and the for more information regarding AA&E items. C8.3.2.2. White Phosphorous and Cluster Munitions. Munitions containing White Phosphorous and cluster munitions permissible for transfer under U.S. law are transferred with restrictions on the conditions under which they may by employed. SCOs should be aware of partner nation inventories of these weapons and the restrictions on them, and alert to reports of how the partner nation is employing them in operations. SCOs should report to DSCA (Integrated Regional Teams (IRT) Country Portfolio Director (CPD)) any information that suggests these items are not being used in accordance with the terms under which they were sold. C8.4. - Enhanced EUM C8.4.1. Definition. Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM), based on the principle of trust with verification, is required for defense articles or munitions controlled items designated for EEUM by the MILDEP's export policy, the inter-agency release process, or by the Department of Defense (DoD) policy as a result of consultation with Congress and/or the Department of State (DOS). EEUM requires physical security assessments of the storage facilities and serial number inventories of designated defense articles to verify compliance with the transfer conditions of the LOAs and other transfer agreements. All EEUM-designated defense articles are required to be sold on defined order lines using an EEUM-coded Military Articles and Services Listing (MASL) and are accompanied by specialized physical security and accountability notes. The defense articles listed in Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) Table C8.T4. below have been designated for EEUM for all FMS-eligible countries. Other defense articles may require EEUM and /or additional U.S. control measures (e.g. U.S. custody and/or electronic monitoring) on a case-by-case basis as determined in the transfer approval process. Table C8.T4. Defense Articles Designated for EEUM for all FMS-eligible Countries EEUM-Designated Defense Articles Description Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) AMRAAM or other specified AMRAAM defense articles (Guidance Control Section (GCSs)). Air Intercept Missiles-9X (AIM-9X) AIM-9X Missiles, Guidance Units (GU), Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), and Special Air Training Missiles (NATM). ATIRCM Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures (ATIRCM) System Communication Security (COMSEC) Equipment COMSEC items are managed and controlled by the National Security Agency (NSA). Harpoon Block II Missiles Harpoon Block II missile and/or other specified Harpoon Block II Missile defense articles (Retrofit kits and GCUs). Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units (CLUs) Javelin Missiles and CLUs only. Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) JASSM or other specified JASSM enhanced defense articles. Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW) JSOW or other specified JSOW defense articles (Captive Flight Vehicles (CFV), and Missile Simulator Units (MSU)). Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) LAIRCM components as specified in the LOA note. LMAMS Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System (LMAMS) Switchblade Night Vision Devices (NVDs) (Man-portable Devices only) For each FMS offer of man-portable NVDs, the Implementing Agency will include the DSCA NVD Approval memorandum as supporting documentation to the LOA. For NVD exports, the partner nation must provide the SCO a copy of the physical security and accountability control plan (NVD Control Plan) signed by a partner nation competent authority for the protection and security of NVDs. The NVD Control Plan must be provided within 30 days of signing the LOA, and must direct all subordinate organizations to comply with the plan. NVDs will not be delivered until receipt of the NVD Control Plan. SCO will review and maintain a copy of the purchaser's NVD Control Plan and forward a copy to [email protected]. SCOs must provide a written report to DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA)) within 30 calendar days of any reported loss, theft, or unauthorized access of any NVD provided to the partner nation. Small Diameter Bomb, Increment Two (SDB-II) / GBU-53 SDB-II All Up Round (AUR), GBU-53/B; SDB II Guided Test Vehicle (GTV), GBU-53(T-1)/B; and SDB II Captive Carry Vehicle (CCV), GBU-53(T-2)/B Embedded COMSEC items are managed by the National Security Agency (NSA) Standard Missiles-3 (SM-3) Standard Missiles-3 (SM-3) Standard Missiles-6 (SM-6) Standard Missiles-6 (SM-6) Standoff Land Attack Missiles Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) SLAM-ER or other specified SLAM-ER defense articles, (Retrofit kits and Guidance Control Unit (GCU)). Stinger Missiles and Gripstocks Stinger Missiles designated for EEUM may include, but are not limited to: MANPADS, AVENGER, Linebacker, and Vehicle Mounted Stinger Launch Platform (VMSLP). Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) THAAD missiles or Radar systems Tomahawk Missiles Tomahawk Missiles Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) designated as Category I by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or as specified in the LOA UAS and system components as specified in the LOA note. C8.4.1.1. SCOs are responsible for maintaining an accurate baseline of all EEUM-designated defense articles exported to the partner nation. The baseline must be maintained by using the EUM application in the SCIP-EUM database to document all EEUM-designated items delivered to the partner nation, inventory monitoring and historical data. The SCIP-EUM database provides a centralized, secure information repository of EUM data gained from deliveries and inventories of all EEUM-designated defense articles transferred through FMS, grant assistance, and other security cooperation programs. The SCIP-EUM database provides a Reconciliation Report of EEUM-designated defense articles by country that SCOs must use as the basis for establishing the baseline and all required inventories and reporting. Recording in the SCIP-EUM database includes accountability of inventories and final disposition, i.e., expended, lost, and destroyed, of all EEUM-designated defense articles. To ensure that an accurate baseline of the EEUM-designated items is maintained, SCOs must ensure the partner nation reports any losses, firings/expenditures, or disposal of any EEUM-designated defense article as required in the transfer agreement and enter the information in the SCIP-EUM database. SCOs must immediately report losses of EEUM-designated defense articles to DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA)), the GCC and DoS PM/RSAT for situational awareness. After the initial report, the SCO must work with the partner nation to obtain a written report with details of the incident and forward the report to DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA)) within 30 calendar days. The report should include the steps being taken to recover the equipment (if applicable) and to prevent recurrence. SCOs must annotate the loss in the SCIP-EUM database by changing the item(s) disposition and must ensure that the partner nation’s report is properly uploaded in the database as supporting documentation and historical record of the loss. C8.4.1.2. SCOs are required to conduct EEUM checks through planned/coordinated visits to the partner nation’s installations to verify in-country receipt of EEUM-designated defense articles by serial number within 90 days of delivery. If during the conduct of the initial inventory the items are located at their storage sites (not temporary holding areas such as customs facilities), an assessment of the storage site(s) must also be performed. Subsequent EEUM checks require serial number verification and physical security assessments of storage sites or other facilities where EEUM-designated defense articles are kept to verify that recipients are complying with the terms and conditions stated in the transfer agreements. SCOs must visually inventory 100 percent of in-country EEUM-designated defense articles within one year from the last inventory performed, except for those EEUM-designated defense articles not available for observation (deployed, returned to the United States for repair, etc.), or as stipulated otherwise in the SCIP-EUM database or by separate policy memo. The inventory must include review of the recipient’s accountability procedures and inventory records as required by the LOA or other transfer document. EEUM-designated items not available for inventory during their annual inventory cycle due to deployment, returned to the United States for repair, or other legitimate reason, must be inventoried within 90 days after returning from deployment or repair. SCOs must confirm with the respective MILDEP program office or U.S. vendor, the accountability of all EEUM-designated items under repair prior to annotating the items’ deployed status in the SCIP-EUM database. SCOs will provide the partner nation formal notification of all findings noted during EEUM checks and request the partner nation to provide within 60 days a report specifying the actions being taken to correct the findings. C8.4.1.3. EEUM checks must be performed using DoD GS EEUM checklists and the policy guidance and procedures published in the SCIP-EUM database. One checklist must be used and filled out for each storage facility assessed. All EEUM checks must be recorded using the DoD GS EEUM checklists, and the checklists must be attached to the inventory records electronically via the SCIP-EUM database. Golden Sentry seals (cables and labels) can be installed on containers (if feasible and the partner nation allows it), to increase security of the missiles and reduce labor during future annual inventories. The seals are obtained from DSCA’s EUM team but must be controlled by USG personnel to prevent proliferation. C8.4.1.4. All COMSEC products require Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) and is documented in COMSEC management systems other than Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). Transferred COMSEC products are changed from EEUM to Routine EUM in SCIP (unless EEUM for additional reasons other than COMSEC) but retain the EEUM and documentation requirements, as follows: C8.4.1.4.1. The EEUM of COMSEC products purchased by Partners or Allies and retained by U.S. government or industry for testing, integration, etc., is performed by the U.S. government or industry's respective COMSEC safeguarding, accountability, and reporting procedures. C8.4.1.4.2. The EEUM of COMSEC products transferred to NATO, NATO member nations, Australia, and New Zealand is performed by recipient nation IAW their COMSEC policies and regulations. C8.4.1.4.3. The EEUM of COMSEC products transferred to International organizations other than NATO and non-NATO member nations except Australia and New Zealand who have signed a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) or like agreement is accomplished by the FMS-funded U.S. COMSEC custodians. C8.4.1.4.4. The EEUM of COMSEC products transferred to non-NATO member nations who have not signed a CISMOA or like agreement is accomplished by the SCOs and reported to their respective theater CCMD Theater COMSEC Account. CCMDs must ensure SCOs perform the required COMSEC security and accountability checks. C8.4.1.5. Network Enabled Weapons (NEW) with NSA Type 1 COMSEC encrypted datalink require COMSEC EUM IAW C8.4.1.4. and may require additional monitoring requirements. C8.4.2. EEUM requires commitment of USG resources; therefore, all documents designating defense articles for EEUM by the MILDEPs or OSD(P) will be approved and signed at the General Officer, Flag Officer or SES level. Documents designating defense articles for EEUM through the interagency technology release process will be signed by the respective committee chairman. Some defense articles may require additional U.S. control measures (e.g. U.S. custody) as a condition of the transfer approval. In these cases, all costs necessary to implement the additional USG control measures levied as part of the transfer approval (beyond regular EEUM checks as stated in through of this chapter) will be paid by the Purchaser. The Purchaser’s obligation to pay for these additional security measures will be stated in the LOA security and accountability note. depicts the decision process used to determine whether an item or an individual transfer will be identified and designated for EEUM. DSCA staffing to ensure that all required actions are taken to add defense articles to EEUM list include the following. C8.4.2.1. Determining the MASL EUM code. DSCA Directorate for Security Assistance, Assistance and Monitoring Programs (DSA/AMP)), will coordinate with DSCA (Directorate of Business Operations (DBO)) and the respective Military Department (MILDEP) to determine the item's MASL End Use Monitoring (EUM) code. The MASL EUM code of an item designated as Enhanced for all FMS exports will be coded as "E". The MASL EUM code of an item designated for Routine EUM will be coded as "R". If it is determined in the transfer approval process that an item normally handled as Routine is required to be treated as Enhanced for a specific sale, the Implementing Agency will request a Case-Unique MASL coded "E" for use of the sale. C8.4.2.2. Developing LOA physical security and accountability EEUM Note. For the defense articles listed in the SAMM as EEUM, DSCA (DSA /AMP), in coordination with the MILDEPs / Implementing Agencies (IAs) (Headquarters and Program Offices), the Defense Technology Security Administration (International Security Programs), DSCA (Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate (SPP)), DSCA (DSA Weapons (WPNs)), and DSCA Office of the General Counsel (OGC)) will lead all staffing efforts to ensure that the MILDEPs/IAs develop the physical security and accountability (EEUM) notes. MILDEPs/IAs are responsible for providing DSCA SME support in drafting security, accountability, and USG control measures included on the LOA to ensure that the parameters levied in the EEUM-designation are met for all EEUM defense articles. EEUM Notes that are coordinated and approved by DSCA AMP for an Enhanced Case-Unique article will be used each time the same Enhanced Case-Unique article is included on a different LOA. C8.4.2.3. Publishing physical security and accountability EEUM notes for inclusion on the LOA. DSCA Standard EEUM and physical security an accountability notes (listed in Appendix 6 of the SAMM) will be included in the LOA by DSCA (DSA Case Writing Division (CWD)). Enhanced Case-Unique EEUM notes will be included in the LOA by the IA responsible for these articles. C8.4.2.4. Developing and validating EEUM checklists. DSCA (DSA AMP Division) will coordinate with the respective MILDEP/IA, as required, to develop and publish in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) EUM database the DoD GS EEUM checklists for the weapons system or technology designated for EEUM. The relevant Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) and DSCA (DSA AMP Division) will validate the DoD GS EEUM checklists during EEUM checks, and will provide the MILDEP/IA recommendations for improvement when required. Figure C8.F1. Designating Defense Articles for Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM) 
Figure C8.F2. Designating Enhanced Case Unique Defense Articles Process Flow
C8.4.3. Site Surveys/Certification of Storage Facilities. With the exception of Night Vision Devices and Communications Security (COMSEC) equipment, and hostile environments (), Implementing Agencies / Military Departments (IAs / MILDEPs) are responsible for conducting physical security inspections for certifications of partner nations’ storage facilities before EEUM-designated weapons systems and enhanced case-unique weapons systems are delivered or moved to a new or uncertified facility. IA / MILDEP will certify foreign countries’ weapons storage facilities to standards specified in accordance with DoD Manual 5100.76-M, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,” or by other appropriate authorities for EEUM articles not listed in DoD Manual 5100.76-M. Discrepancies identified during the physical security storage facility inspections shall be corrected or compensatory measures implemented prior to shipment of any EEUM-designated items and enhanced case-unique weapons systems. C8.4.3.1. Security Managers and Site Certification Reports. The IA / MILDEP will ensure DSCA has a current list, by weapon system, of all security inspectors/managers responsible for conducting physical security inspections and certifications. The IA / MILDEP will provide DSCA a copy of all facility certification reports within 30 calendar days of conducting the facility certification by ensuring the reports are uploaded to the site certification repository within the SCIP-EUM database. C8.4.3.2. Facility Certification Costs. (lines 16 and 86) addresses the proper source of funding to pay for foreign facility certifications. Certification of foreign sites/facilities storing equipment designated for EEUM and enhanced case-unique weapons systems shall be case-funded. FMS admin funds may be used to certify foreign facilities prior to LOA implementation; however, these costs must be reimbursed on the subsequent LOA. If a LOA is never implemented, the IA Pre-LOR funds remain the proper funding source. C8.4.3.3. Facility Certification Reciprocity. Foreign partner facility certifications shall be conducted consistent with the appropriate Security Risk Category (SRC) of the weapon system to be stored. Excluding specified compensatory measures, facility certifications by one IA / MILDEP in one SRC are reciprocally accepted for storage of weapons systems offered by another MILDEP in the same SRC when applicable. IA / MILDEP security inspectors/managers will coordinate facility inspection visits with DSCA, SCOs, and other MILDEPs in advance to prevent the need to conduct a new facility inspection if another IA / MILDEP has already certified the same facility. The site certification repository within the SCIP-EUM database will indicate if certification by another IA / MILDEP already exists at a proposed storage location. DSCA will work with the IA / MILDEP to ensure standardized physical security inspection/certification checklists are developed for each SRC. C8.4.3.4. Compensatory Measures. All IA / MILDEP facility certifications shall be conducted consistent with the appropriate Security Risk Category (SRC) of the weapon system to be stored and other items designated as EEUM must be protected to substantially the same level of security as afforded by the USG. The IA / MILDEP must document any areas where the foreign facilities do not meet the physical security requirements stated in DoD Manual 5100.76-M, by other appropriate authorities, stipulated in the LOAs, or required by using risk management principles and will identify if any acceptable compensatory measures are in place or required. SCOs shall verify that compensatory measures remain in place during annual inspections as documented by the IA / MILDEP. C8.4.3.5. Facility Changes. Substantial changes to certified facilities at any time that cause them to no longer meet the physical security requirements will need to be recertified. In addition, newly built foreign storage facilities will need to be certified prior to storing designated EEUM articles and enhanced case-unique weapon systems. The effort to certify and recertify storage facilities shall be case-funded. SCOs will report foreign facility discrepancies and newly-built foreign facilities storing EEUM-designated items and enhanced case-unique weapons systems to DSCA and the IA / MILDEP within 72-hours after discovery. C8.4.4. EEUM Cost Reporting Requirements. DSCA is responsible for submitting an annual report to Congress, as required by AECA Section 40A (22 U.S.C. 2785), through DoS PM that includes the costs for executing the Golden Sentry program. C8.4.4.1. At the end of each fiscal year, the CCMDs and SCOs are required to submit the actual annual costs and future two-year FMF Administrative budget projections associated with conducting EEUM, including travel to perform physical security and accountability inventories of in-country equipment and future deliveries and to attend EUM training. To maintain accurate cost data and reporting, EUM managers should ensure that upon completion of each EEUM visit that the cost is documented and entered into the DAI Code 210.15. Each entry will include a brief description of the EEUM function performed, e.g., number of personnel, equipment inventoried, locations visited. All costs necessary to implement additional USG control measures (e.g. U.S. custody) levied as a condition of the transfer will be paid by the Purchaser. C8.4.4.2. On a case-by-case basis, SCOs may request, through the CCMD, FMF Administrative funding to meet unexpected requirements to perform EEUM checks due to disposal verifications or other unforeseen EUM-related activities for which funding was not requested in the regular budget cycle. Unfunded requirements must be submitted to the appropriate CCMD for approval. When CCMD FMF Administrative funds are not sufficient or available, CCMDs may request FMF Administrative funding from DSCA (Directorate of Business Operations (DBO)) to meet unforeseen SCO EEUM-related requirements. C8.4.4.3. SCO questions regarding entries for conducting EEUM functions in DAI or unfunded requirement requests should be submitted to the CCMD. CCMD questions should be sent to DSCA (Directorate of Business Operations (DBO)). C8.5. - Golden Sentry Program Visit Policy and Guidance C8.5.1. EUM Visit Guidance. The Golden Sentry EUM program includes in-country visits. There are four types of EUM visits:
Each visit is unique to the partner nation and equipment being assessed. C8.5.2. EUM Familiarization and Assistance Visit (FAV) Guidance. The purpose of an EUM FAV is to assist the partner nation, the SCO (or equivalent organization/office), and the CCMD in developing an effective EUM compliance program. It also provides an opportunity for the DSCA EUM representative to determine the requirements for conducting a potential future EUM CAV or VCA. A FAV may be prompted by a request from the partner nation, SCO, or the CCMD to validate EUM programs. A FAV can also be prompted by the introduction of specific equipment into the region/country. outlines the timeline and formal requirements for a well-coordinated and documented EUM FAV. Informal correspondence may occur prior to these actions. Table C8.T5. EUM Familiarization and Assistance Visit (FAV) Timeline and Requirements Event No. Timeframe Description 1 Not later than 30 calendar days prior to visit
2 Upon receipt of Country/Theater clearance message
3 15 calendar days prior to visit
4 Familiarization Visit
5 No later than 15 calendar days after return to CONUS
C8.5.3. EUM Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV) Guidance. The purpose of a CAV or VCA is to review and evaluate the SCO's (or equivalent organization/ office) compliance with Golden Sentry EUM policy and procedures in accordance with by using the SCO checklist (available in the SCIP-EUM database) and the partner nation's compliance with specific physical security and accountability requirements, as well as other terms of sale. Activities during a CAV or VCA may include facility visits, record reviews, review of REUM and EEUM policies and procedures, and inventories of U.S.-origin defense articles. EUM CAVs or VCAs are coordinated in advance with the CCMD, SCO, and partner nation to ensure the success of the assessment. To maximize resources and minimize disruptions, EUM site visits should be arranged to coincide with scheduled partner nations inventory dates whenever possible. outlines the timeline and formal requirements to ensure a well-coordinated and documented EUM CAV or VCA. Informal correspondence may occur prior to these actions. Inability to obtain proper entry credentials for the CAV or VCA Team from the recipient country will result in unfavorable reports within the DoS and DoD and may result in mention in the annual report to Congress. C8.5.3.1. Factors DSCA considers when determining countries to be scheduled for CAVs or VCAs include, but are not limited to, the following:
C8.5.3.1.1. EUM Virtual Compliance Assessments (VCAs) Guidance. A VCA is conducted similar to a CAV (See ); however, conducted remotely and without travel by DSCA staff. DSCA may conduct a VCA when circumstances exist that impede travel, including budget constraints, heightened security risk, and other limitations DSCA deems a VCA necessary. The purpose of virtual CAVs remains the same as a standard CAV, which consists of reviewing and evaluating SCOs compliance with Golden Sentry EUM Policy and partner nations' compliance with specific physical security and accountability agreements, provisos, and other terms of sale. The VCA timeline and requirements are identified in and the VCA Guidance Plan found in the SCIP-EUM database. C8.5.3.2. To assist in planning and coordination with the partner nation, a two-year CAV plan has been institutionalized through formal message notifications to the CCMDs and SCOs. The two-year plan is published at the beginning of each fiscal year, and provides a quarterly CAV or VCA schedule by CCMD and country. DSCA may, in coordination with the appropriate CCMD, perform additional out-of-cycle CAVs or VCAs as necessary to execute the EUM mission. Table C8.T6. EUM Compliance Assessment Visit Timeline and Requirements Event No. Timeframe Description 1 Initial Notification Annually by Fiscal Year
2 Upon receipt of the Annual Fiscal Year CAV Message
3 90 calendar days prior to the visit
4 80 calendar days prior to visit
5 70 calendar days prior to visit
6 60 calendar days prior to visit
7 Not later than 30 calendar days prior to visit
8 Upon receipt of Country/Theater Clearance Message
9 15 calendar days prior to visit
10 EUM Compliance Assessment Visit (CAV)
11 Immediately upon identification of problems that preclude successful completion of the CAV
12 Immediately upon discovery of a potential AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation.
13 No later than 5 working days after the visit
14 No later than 10 working days after the visit
15 No later than 15 working days after the visit
16 No later than 90 days after receipt of the CAV Report
C8.5.3.3. CAV Rating Criteria. The CAV or VCA rating is based on the team's assessment of: C8.5.3.3.1. SCO compliance with the policies and procedures of the Golden Sentry program SCO responsibilities stated in the SCO checklist published in the SCIP-EUM database and including:
C8.5.3.3.2. Country compliance with the conditions of the transfer agreements for U.S.-provided defense articles and services, including:
C8.5.4. Focused Verification Checks (FVC). Focused Verification Checks (FVC) are ad hoc inspections of U.S.-origin defense articles for which there are concerns regarding their use, transfer, and physical security. FVCs are directed at the discretion of the Director, DSCA and provide the Director, DSCA greater visibility and real-time situational awareness of U.S.-origin defense articles. FVCs are a mechanism by which the Director can proactively address issues that could lead to actual end-use violations. C8.5.4.1. Transmittal. DSCA will transmit FVC requests to SCOs through their assigned Combatant Command. The transmittal will identify the type, quantity, and location of U.S.-origin defense articles to be inspected and the date by which the verification must be completed. FVC requests may include one or more U.S.-origin defense articles at one or more locations. C8.5.4.2. FVC Execution. SCOs will conduct FVCs in accordance with Routine- or Enhanced-EUM procedures based on the EUM-designation assigned to the U.S.-origin defense article(s) being checked. In some cases, DSCA personnel may conduct the FVC. FVCs are considered complete once SCOs have uploaded or submitted all required documentation in the SCIP-EUM database, as identified in and . As with any Routine- or Enhanced-EUM check, potential end-use violations must be immediately reported to DSCA and State through their respective EUM Potential End-Use Violation inbox (Unclassified: [email protected] and [email protected]; or Classified: [email protected] and [email protected] ). C8.5.4.3. Extensions. SCOs may submit a written request for an extension to complete an FVC to the DSCA EUM Program Manager through their assigned combatant command. Extension requests should include the proposed new completion date and a justification for the request. C8.5.5. Conducting EUM in a Hostile Environment. The following policy sets procedures for the conduct of EUM when force protection limitations exist that could endanger USG personnel performing Routine EUM observations, EEUM inventories, and physical security inspections of Partner Nations’ (PN) storage facilities. This process applies to reporting potential violations and the accountability of Enhanced EUM (EEUM) defense articles identified in SAMM or other defense articles that require EEUM and / or additional U.S. required control measures as determined in the transfer approval process. To mitigate proliferation and to comply with the requirement in Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2785) that the EUM program provide ‘reasonable assurance’ that the PN is complying with U.S. End Use requirements, the following procedures are to be implemented. C8.5.5.1. Accountability of U.S. defense articles deployed to restricted areas that cannot be inventoried due to heightened security risk. When conditions allow, the SCO shall conduct an initial 100% inventory, by serial number, of all EEUM designated articles prior to shipment/delivery into hostile areas. The SCO shall also assist locally employed staff and the PN to improve inventory management and accountability procedures of EEUM designated articles currently in restricted areas. C8.5.5.2. Partner Nation Self-Reporting. Under certain circumstances, when USG led assessments are not possible, PN ‘Self-Reporting’ can be accomplished by providing the SCO with records of inventories, other accountability records, or the use of barcode scanning. PN self-reporting is authorized only when the following criteria are met:
C8.5.5.3. Acceptable PN Documentation. SCOs shall update, and keep current, the disposition status of U.S. provided EEUM defense articles within the SCIP-EUM database based on PN provided accountability documentation. The disposition status “Observed by Partner Nation” shall be used for defense articles still in PN possession. All documentation shall include the defense article description, serial numbers, date of observation, and current disposition status (e.g., active, expended, destroyed, or lost). Acceptable PN documentation can be:
C8.5.5.4. For sensitive self-reporting data at a classified level, due to OPSEC concerns, the SCOs shall obtain, scan/upload, and forward sensitive PN-provided data to [email protected]. C8.5.5.5. Frequency of Self-Reporting. Frequency is dependent on the PN’s inventory and accountability requirements in accordance with the LOA, the EEUM Control Plan, and the PN self-reporting CONOPs; and subject to USG discretion. C8.6. - Unauthorized End-Use C8.6.1. Potential End-Use Violations. While conducting end-use REUM and EEUM checks, SCO personnel should be alert for unauthorized use of defense articles, defense services, or technical data, including information provided during CONUS or in-country training. The checks should provide information for both the recipient country and the United States to determine whether a partner nation’s generally sound processes failed due to unusual circumstances, because security and accountability procedures are not given sufficient priority, or because country interests are diverging from those of the United States. Information gained during the special checks that could be useful in correcting the immediate problem or improving future end-use controls should be shared with the State and DSCA (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Assistance & Monitoring Division (IOPS/GEX/AMD)). C8.6.2. Reporting End-Use Violations. SCOs must report all potential unauthorized end-use, including unauthorized access, unauthorized transfers, security violations or known equipment losses to the CCMD, DSCA (IOPS/REX/AMD), and State (PM/RSAT). SCOs shall be alert to, and report on, any indication that U.S. origin defense articles are being used for unauthorized purposes, are being tampered with or reverse engineered, or are accessible by persons who are not officers, employees, or agents of the recipient government. Potential violations shall be notified via email or message immediately SCOs must assess the sensitivity of the potential violation and other factors to determine the means of notification. The State investigates and reports potential violations and determines whether the AECA Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) criteria require notification to Congress. C8.6.2.1. Reporting. The President is obligated, pursuant to Arms Export Control Act Section 3(c)(2), to report end-use violations to Congress. The Department of State, with input from DoD, is the lead agency responsible for reporting end-use violations. All DoD personnel must report any suspected End-Use violations of U.S.-origin defense articles, including unauthorized access, unauthorized transfers, security violations, or known equipment losses, to the USG either through the SCO or directly to DSCA and State through their respective EUM Potential End-Use Violation inbox (Unclassified: [email protected] and [email protected]; or Classified: [email protected] and [email protected] ). Any non-DoD personnel may also report suspected end-use violations directly to these same organizations or through the same email addresses. C8.6.2.2. Reporting Requirements. A SCO must report a potential end-use violation, or submit an update to a previously reported potential violation, on the basis of information from any source, including a private person unaffiliated with the USG or a foreign citizen. Suspected end-use violation reports should include, to the maximum extent possible, the following information:
C8.6.2.2.1. When available, the incident number should always be included in the subject line of any updates as well as the update number, e.g. 1st Update, 2nd Update, etc. Reports involving classified information must be transmitted via a secure, classified network. C8.6.2.2.2. Upon receipt of an incident report, State Department will take the lead on coordinating the U.S. Government response, which will include potential courses of action. When State receives information on potential end-use violations through its channels, it will share that information with DSCA. Figure C8.F3. Section 3 Violation Reporting Process
C.8.6.2.3. Roles and Responsibilities for Investigation of a Suspected End-Use Violation. C8.6.2.3.1. SCO - Forwards reports received from other USG or non-USG personnel as well as any potential violations uncovered during Enhanced- or Routine- EUM checks to the appropriate DoD and State EUM Potential Violation email inboxes. Assists in collecting or obtaining additional information related to a potential EUM violation. Assists in the enforcement and application of consequences, as determined by the Department of State, resulting from confirmed end-use violations. C8.6.2.3.2. DSCA/EUM - Monitors/manages the classified and unclassified DoD EUM Potential Violation email inbox. Maintains a master repository of reported potential end-use violations. Ensures the SCO and proper POCs at the CCMD are aware of all reported potential violations in their AOR. Assigns potential violation reports an incident tracking number. Assesses reports for completeness and credibility, and, when necessary, collects or obtains additional information. Assists in the enforcement and application of consequences, as determined by the Department of State, resulting from confirmed end-use violations. C8.6.2.3.3. PM/RSAT - Serves as the primary USG authority for responding to reports of potential end-use violations, communicating to DoD the DOS investigation status of and other information related to potential end-use violations. Receives potential end-use violations and conducts investigations. In coordination with the diplomatic and security cooperation communities, determines the actions to be taken, if any, by the USG to address findings in the investigation reports. As necessary, reports findings to Congress. C8.6.3. EUM Investigation Visits and Special End-Use Monitoring Checks. The SCO may be required to provide additional information to assist with the investigation process, and special EUM checks may be required to determine the country’s compliance with the transfer agreements. The purpose of an EUM Investigation Visit is to examine possible violations of AECA Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753), FAA, Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314), and any applicable diplomatic notes or agreements regarding the defense articles. These visits may be prompted by intelligence reports and/or other sources that indicate a partner nation may be using U.S.-origin defense articles and services in ways that do not comply with U.S. laws and policies. EUM Investigation Visits are conducted as expeditiously as possible within the required coordination for foreign travel. Due to the unique nature and political sensitivity associated with this type of visit, each EUM Investigation Visit is handled on a case-by-case basis in concert with DoS. C8.7. - Third Party Transfers, Changes in End-Use, and Disposal C8.7.1. In accordance with the FAA, Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314); AECA Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753); and the LOA Standard Terms and Conditions, foreign governments may not transfer title to or possession of any defense articles or services to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent (defined as freight forwarder only) of that country or of the USG until the country receives prior written consent from the USG. Nor may the foreign government use or permit the use of such articles or services for purposes other than for which they were furnished unless the foreign government receives prior written consent from the USG. SCOs should be aware of the pertinent agreements with the recipient country including any special diplomatic notes or agreements that apply to the defense articles involved. SCOs should contact their Country Portfolio Director (CPD) to ensure that they have all pertinent agreements. C8.7.2. Third Party Transfer Responsibilities. C8.7.2.1. Department of State. The DoS is responsible for authorizing third party transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and/or services worldwide. C8.7.2.1.1. Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfer Policy (PM/RSAT). DoS (PM/RSAT) is responsible for coordinating the DoS response for requests to transfer defense articles to a third party, including all associated components, technical data, training, and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs (e.g., FMF, P.L. 109-163, Section 2282 (as extended), Military Assistance Program (MAP), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Drawdown) and requests for the demilitarization and disposal of the items. See the DoS web page at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-regional-security-and-arms-transfers/ for additional information. C8.7.2.1.2. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC). Pursuant to AECA, section 38 (22 U.S.C. 2778) and the International Traffic In Arms Regulation (ITAR) (22 C.F.R. 120-130), DoS (PM/DDTC) is responsible for processing requests to transfer defense articles or services originally acquired under a commercial export license or other commercial authorization (such as manufacturing license or technical assistance agreements). See ITAR Section 123.9. for additional information. DoS (PM/DDTC) also authorizes temporary imports of defense articles into the United States. C8.7.2.2. Department of Justice (DoJ). The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) is responsible for control of the permanent import of U.S. Munitions List (USML) (22 C.F.R. 121.1) items into the United States. DoS approval of a retransfer request by a foreign government must precede and be separate from submission by the importer of an ATF Form 6 import license application to BATFE. C8.7.2.3. Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs). SCOs are directly involved only in actions related to retransfers of items received through DoD-administered programs. They do not process requests for retransfers of defense articles procured by commercial means. Owning countries make such requests directly to the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls through their embassies in Washington, D.C. C8.7.3. Third Party Transfer Requests: Government-To-Government. The U.S. Government requires recipients of U.S.-origin defense articles, services, or technical data to obtain written consent from DoS PM/RSAT prior to transfer, disposal, or change of end-use of its U.S.-origin articles, services, or data. Such approval is required for all transfers, changes of end-use, or changes of destination not previously authorized in the original acquisition. Included are defense articles and technical data obtained through FMS, MAP, or EDA programs. Third Party Transfer (TPT) decisions are made on a case-by-case basis and are guided by general criteria and specific third party transfer requirements of arms transfer law, regulations, and policies. See SAMM and The information required for the Standard Questionnaire is provided in See DoS PM/RSAT’s TPT page for step-by-step instructions and an example of a completed questionnaire. Divesting governments may send TPT requests directly to the Third Party Transfer Team in PM/RSAT ([email protected]), through their embassies, or through the SCOs. Working through the SCOs is highly encouraged. However, PM/RSAT is currently making the transition to an online web-based application within the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), which will receive and track TPT requests. Divesting governments are highly encouraged to utilize SCIP for their submissions, as PM/RSAT intends to eliminate the paper TPT (i.e., receipt and processing of cases via email) entirely by January 2018 or soon thereafter. To register for an account, users must complete a Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) Registration Form and send it to SCIP admin, requesting access to the State community as "Creator" at https://www.scportal.us/home/. SCIP help/support can be found on the tab within the account. After the transfer is complete, the SCO should upload to the SCIP-EUM module all pertinent documents. If the transfer involves EEUM-designated items, the SCO must contact the EUM Help Desk to update the EEUM baseline for the partner nations involved in the Third Party Transfer. Table C8.T7. Required Information for Third Party Transfer Standard Questionnaire # Required Information 1 The name of the divesting government. 2 A clear description of the articles, services, technical data, or training being transferred including quantity, model, any associated equipment, spare parts and/or classified components or data. Also, where possible, indicate whether equipment is Significant Military Equipment (SME) or non-SME and the category under which the article is listed in the USML. Serial numbers must be provided for SME. If the equipment has been moved from the USML to the Commerce Control List (CCL) (a TPT is still required if items that are now on the CCL were acquired via FMS), please state if the equipment is on the CCL and identify the ECCN if possible. If the items involve:
Requests involving the use of Foreign Integrators for US COMSEC should include the following:
3 The original acquisition source of the defense articles, services, technical data, or training proposed for transfer (e.g., FMS, grant, MAP, EDA, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) case transfer, etc.). The case identifier must be provided for FMS or an explanation as to why it is unavailable. 4 The year of original acquisition. 5 The original acquisition cost or best estimate of that cost. 6 The current value if available. 7 The reason the government wants to divest itself of the articles, services, technical data, or training. If by demilitarization and disposal, describe how it will be accomplished. 8 The proposed recipient. 9 Indicate whether the transfer is temporary or permanent. 10 If known, the proposed end-use of the articles, services, technical data, or training by the proposed recipient. 11 Indicate whether the recipient has the defense article proposed for transfer in its inventory. 12 Estimation of net proceeds. In accordance with FAA, Section 505(f) and prerequisite bilateral agreements, if the defense articles were furnished to a country on a grant basis (e.g., MAP-grants, grant EDA), the net proceeds of the sale of the defense articles received by the grantee must be returned to the USG. The following factors relating to the defense articles should be considered in determining the net proceeds: the value of the defense articles when furnished by the USG as a percentage of the aggregate of the value of the defense articles when furnished by the USG added to the value of any capital investment incurred by the grantee in repairing, rehabilitating, or modifying the article (other than routine maintenance and repair expenses); depreciation of that value; and reasonable administrative costs of the sale or disposal. The party requesting the third party transfer of such defense articles must show it has employed a reasonable methodology in calculating the net proceeds [e.g., Net Proceeds = (Gross Sale Proceeds – Administrative Costs of Sale) x (Value at Transfer / (Value at Transfer + Value of Capital Investment))]. DoS may waive return of net proceeds in cases involving grant equipment delivered prior to 1985. There is no waiver authority for articles delivered after 1985. Requests for waiver consideration are included in written transfer requests and must include an estimate of the net proceeds expected, justification/rationale for the request to retain net proceeds, and how the funds will be used. 13 Indicate whether an intermediary is involved in the transfer. If so, provide a description of the role (broker, freight forwarder, etc.), the business address, and a point of contact. 14 Proposed timeframe or time constraints with regard to DoS processing of the request. If immediate action is required, provide explanation. 15 The name, title, and contact details for an official in the divesting and recipient countries with whom DoS (PM/RSAT) can discuss the transfer details and required end-use, retransfer, and assurances. C8.7.3.1. End-Use, Retransfer, and Security Assurances. The DoS requires end-use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed recipient’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) unless the proposed recipient is a member of the Blanket Assurance Program. See The assurances must be obtained by the divesting government and submitted with the retransfer request. These assurances are mandatory, generally non-negotiable, and must be received by DoS before the transfer can be considered for approval. Assurances must be typed in English and signed by an official of the proposed recipient country who can legally bind the entire government (usually the MFA). If the government issues assurances signed by an official of a ministry other than the MFA, such as the Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Embassy in that country must confirm in writing that his or her signature is binding. When language is supplied that does not appear to meet U.S. requirements, the DoS PM/RSAT TPT team coordinates with the Department’s legal counsel to determine whether the language will be accepted. If the language is deemed unacceptable, PM/RSAT will not process the case. C8.7.3.2. Blanket Assurances. Governments may sign blanket end-use, retransfer, and security assurances to satisfy legislative requirements for future government-to-government retransfers. Governments that sign Blanket Assurances are not required to sign individual assurances to receive USG-origin defense articles from foreign governments. Blanket members under the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) (https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/arms/bureau_pm/dtc/fs_000524_extension.html) program have the added benefit of limited advanced USG consent. Members can transfer between and among themselves when: the original acquisition value of all transferred articles does not exceed $7 million; classified defense articles (including classified technical information) are not being transferred; the defense articles to be transferred are already in the inventory of the proposed recipient (no first introduction); and the proposed recipient is either an approved DTSI country (NATO members, Japan, Australia, or Sweden) or a signatory to the standard blanket assurance program. DTSI assurances, like blanket assurances, apply only to government-to-government third-party transfers of USG-origin defense articles. DTSI assurances do not replace the DSP 83 currently used for the retransfer of defense articles originally acquired through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Requests for retransfer of DCS-acquired items continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the DoS (PM/DDTC). Governments interested in participating in DTSI should contact DoS (PM/RSAT) for further information. C8.7.4. Third Party Transfer Requests Government-to-Non-States or Private Entities. As stated in the FAA and AECA, defense articles and defense services are transferred to foreign governments and international organizations to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives. Following the receipt of a request to transfer U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services from a foreign government or international organization, the DoS adjudicates all requests for transfer of U.S.-origin military equipment to non-states, including private entities, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and other non-state groups, on a case-by-case basis. In submitting a government-to-non-state transfer request, the divesting country and the SCO follow the same instructions as provided above in SAMM and For retransfers to private entities, the request should include end use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed private entity recipient, as well as Country Over Private Entity (COPE) assurances from the government with legal jurisdiction over the private entity. The written transfer request should include contact details for a representative of the private entity. If a prime contractor is listed specifically on the LOA and is confirmed to be contracted by the USG in order to directly support and provide services to the USG on that FMS case, then a third party transfer request may not be required. DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA)) and DoS PM/RSAT will coordinate to identify the contractor in an LOA note. C8.7.5. Congressional Requirements for Third Party Transfers. As provided in the FAA and the AECA, certain third party transfers of defense articles, including all associated components, technical data, training, and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs, are subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements. C8.7.5.1. Congressional Notification. Third party transfers of defense articles and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs are subject to requirements for congressional certification pursuant to AECA, Section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753 (d)) using certification thresholds similar to those for AECA, Section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notifications. See SAMM A 30-day prior congressional certification is required for third-party transfer requests that involve defense articles and services with original acquisition values that fall in one of the following categories: Major Defense Equipment (MDE) with an acquisition value equal to or greater than $14M for non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recipients and $25M if the recipient is a member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, or New Zealand; or any other defense article or related training or defense service with an acquisition value of $50M or more for non-NATO recipients and $100M or more if the recipient is a member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. For all recipients, approval is granted after the 30-day calendar day period has expired unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. C8.7.5.2. Transfers pursuant to arrangements among NATO members, or between NATO and any of its member countries for lead-nation procurement are exempt from AECA, Section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753 (d)) certification requirements if the defense article to be transferred was originally purchased from the United States, and the transferee on whose behalf the lead-nation procurement was proposed identified to Congress in a notification pursuant to AECA, Section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)). Information as to possible subsequent transfers by a NATO member country purchasing on behalf of a third NATO party shall be provided to DSCA for inclusion in AECA, Section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notifications. The certification requirement of AECA, Section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753 (d)) also does not apply to the following:
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