Which theory suggest that crime results from a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of criminal activity?

Abstract

Rational choice theory [RCT] is based on the premise of individual self-interested utility maximization. Organizational theory [OT] is based on the premise of efficient functioning of organizations through means/ends rationality within organizations. Organizational economic theory, which consists of transaction cost economics [TCE] and agency theory [AT], forms an indirect link between RCT and OT. However, TCE and AT differ in their grounding premises. Thus, economic organizational frameworks, which purport to link micro-level RCT to meso-organizational theory, are unable to do so, due to the incompatibility of the premises on which RCT and OT rest. As one set of premises are assumed, the other becomes problematic. No OT has successfully integrated RCT and OT.

Introduction

Rational choice theory is a theoretical framework commonly used in various social sciences including economics, political sciences, and sociology. While in economics, rational choice theory has become the dominant paradigm, this has not been the case in sociology. On the contrary, rational choice theory has been widely criticized for its unrealistic assumptions, lack of empirical testing, and limited empirical validity [cf Green and Shapiro, 1994; Goldthorpe, 2000]. While some of these criticisms are related to misconceptions of the interpretation of rational choice theory, others have been seriously taken up by researchers in the field. This has led to more research in which rational choice theory construction is combined with a variety of empirical tests. The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research [Wittek et al., 2013] provides an extensive and recent overview of the literature in this area including theoretical advancements as well as a wide variety of empirical applications of rational choice social research. The handbook is not particularly restricted to sociology, but illustrates research and applications in economics, political science, and history as well [see Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012 for another recent review focusing on Europe and Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997, for an earlier overview focusing on family, gender, and religion]. In this article, we first discuss the properties of the standard rational choice model, the so-called baseline model. Thereafter, we address extensions of the model in terms of macro-level conditions and extensions that elaborate on the micro-level assumptions related to individual behavior. We conclude with a short overview of properties of recent empirical research testing rational choice models and an outlook to possible future developments.

2.4 Deliberation

Rational choice theory [see Rational Choice Theory: Cultural Concerns] is the most serious attempt to fully acknowledge the normativity that is crucial to intentional explanation, and the subjective meanings that play their indispensable role in behavioral and attitudinal rationality, without giving up the aim of a unified science based on erklären. The hope of rational choice theory is to explain and predict human action in terms of laws that causally relate expected utility numbers and ensuing actions. The idea is that for an agent whose preferences conform to various constraints, it is possible to represent him as having a utility function and a probability function such that every action maximizes expected utility as computed by those functions [Eells 1982].

A strong reply is open to those favoring a verstehen approach. It starts from the observation that a choice is not merely an event that occurs, but is always also a decision made by an agent capable of deliberation. Consider a case where a couple wanders down the street, looking for a place to eat, and deciding to opt for that small Thai restaurant next to the popular pizzeria. It is quite likely that explanatory sense can be made of this choice in terms of the calculation of utility numbers and some additional game theoretic considerations about successful co-operation. But such a story is of no use in trying to make sense of their conversation as a matter of deliberation [Pettit 1991]. If we want to make sense of the way in which the woman replies to a suggestion made by the man, and vice versa, and of how this conversation is their way of making up their minds about where to eat, then we need something rational choice theory does not give us: interpretative understanding. That is, rational choice theory could perhaps make explanatory sense of events that we would ordinarily describe as choices, but making sense of them as choices, as decisions reached by agents who reason their way to these choices, is something that requires a verstehen approach. Making a choice or forming an intention is done by deliberative agents, capable of recognizing and responding to considerations of evidence [‘Look! They serve Teriyaki!’] and valuation [‘Oh, you know, you always hate those crowded places.’].

Agents capable of deliberation should be in epistemic contact with the normative import of the contents of their beliefs and desires. Deliberation requires an intelligibility related to the first-person perspective of a rule-follower. Deliberative agents must be able to exercise their care for the rationality of their beliefs—given what they have reason to believe to be true—as well as their care for the rationality of their desires—given what they have reason to value—and they must be able to decide what to do on the basis of the beliefs and desires they come to accept as rational. Deliberation is not something that looks like explaining and predicting what to do given the expected utility numbers one assigns to possible outcomes. In deliberation, one does not predict one's own actions. Of course, deliberation might involve the weighting of utility numbers, but if it does, it does not do so from the explaining and predictive standpoint of rational choice theory, but from the first-person standpoint of appreciating the normative import of these numbers as reasons on the basis of which one will choose to do what one does. This is so, even in those cases where habits seem to rule [‘Yes, we always end up in this restaurant—but of course, we cannot discuss such predictions as predictions.’].

If we are to think of choices and actions as events brought about by deliberating agents who care to be rational [i.e., who try to determine and follow the appropriate rules] and who ascribe meaning to what they do, we cannot do without verstehen. Although this does not rule out rational choice theory altogether, it does rule out the possibility of a completed social science based on merely an erklären approach.

2.4 Some Common Misunderstandings

Rational choice theory is often criticized, sometimes with good arguments, and sometimes with bad. Although some of the bad arguments may apply to bad versions of the theory, critics ought to address the best versions. The most common misunderstanding is that the theory assumes agents to have selfish motivations. Rationality is consistent with selfishness, but also with altruism, as when someone is trying to select the charity where a donation can do the most good.

Rational choice theory is also sometimes confused with the principle of methodological individualism. True, the theory presupposes that principle. Talk about beliefs and desires of supra-individual entities, such as a class or a nation, is in general meaningless. The converse does not hold, however. Some of the alternatives to rational choice theory also presuppose methodological individualism.

Furthermore, it is sometimes asserted that the theory is atomistic and that it ignores social interactions. Almost the exact opposite is true. Game theory is superbly equipped to handle three important interdependencies: [a] the welfare of each depends on the decisions of all; [b] the welfare of each depends on the welfare of all; and [c] the decision of each depends on the decisions of all. It is also sometimes asserted that the theory assumes human beings to be like powerful computers, which can instantly work out the most complex ramifications of all conceivable options. In principle, rational choice theory can incorporate cognitive constraints on a par with physical or financial constraints. In practice, the critics often have a valid point.

Finally, it is sometimes asserted that the theory is culturally biased, reflecting [and perhaps describing] modern, Western societies or their subcultures. However, the minimal model set out above is transhistorically and transculturally valid. This statement does not imply that people always and everywhere act rationally, nor that they have the same desires and beliefs. It means that the normative ideal of rationality embodied in the model is one that is explicitly or implicitly shared by all human beings. People are instrumentally rational because they adopt the principle of least effort. ‘Do not cross the river to fetch water,’ says a Norwegian proverb. Also, as people know that acting on false beliefs undermines the pursuit of their ends, they want to use cognitive procedures that reduce the risk of getting it wrong when getting it right matters. That they often fail to adopt the right procedures does not undermine the normative ideal.

5.2 Means-ends reasoning

Rational-choice theory contrasts sharply with means-ends reasoning as an approach to instrumental rationality.21 In the language of means and ends, rational-choice theory starts with the means — the courses of action open to the person facing the problem situation — as given, and then proceeds toward the possible ends — the possible outcomes of the options. These possible outcomes correspond to the ends, because their evaluation by the person in question determines which means — that is, which option — is the rational one to choose. In the case of choice under risk this is actually determined by two measures, one measuring the extent of uncertainty, the other measuring strength of preference, but only the latter measure is evaluative. In means-ends reasoning, one starts with the end — a state of the world that one wishes to realize — and then proceeds toward the means — the possible courses of action that lead to the end. The object of means-ends analysis is to generate a list of potential means and to establish that the means would indeed result in the end, or to investigate the circumstances under which they would result in the end, or the form in which they result in the ends, since the state of the world resulting from adopting a particular course of action will usually include more than just the end aimed for.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory takes as its starting point the principle that humans are rational beings who exercise free will in deciding on a course of action. It is based on the classic notion that people will try to achieve the greatest benefits for themselves at the least cost. For the rational choice theorist, even crimes that at first glance appear purely impulsive or pathological are influenced by rational elements, such as the limits of time and personal abilities or skills as well as the availability of relevant information and victims. Each offender has specific individual needs and skills which intersect with situational factors to affect the decision to commit a crime. To prevent crime, then, societies must make the costs outweigh the benefits; that is, the punishment for the crime must be severe enough to deter the potential criminal [an idea known as the deterrence principle].

Rational choice theory has enjoyed considerable popularity, especially among those who believe that the criminal justice system is too lenient with offenders. Critics, however, maintain that rational choice theorists overestimate the extent to which offenders calculate the relative costs and benefits of committing a particular crime. Moreover, critics point out that while committing a crime may be a rational decision under certain circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that severe punishment will deter such criminality. If, for example, an unemployed person decides that it makes more sense to sell drugs than work full time at a fast-food restaurant for the minimum wage, then the solution is not to impose severe punishment for drug selling, but rather to increase employment opportunities with wages that raise workers above the poverty line. Indeed, most research on the deterrence principle indicates that the decision to commit a crime is not significantly affected by the perceived severity of punishment by the legal system, but rather by peer and parental sanctions.

Rational choice theory [RCT] is the name given to an approach that seeks to explain human affairs by making certain simplifying assumptions about what motivates individual action. The assumption is that individuals have preferences toward things in the world [preferring apples to oranges or being altruistic to being selfish] and that they act in a consistent way, that is, they act as though they are trying to get the most of the things they prefer. Acting consistently in this way is known as being rational. Acting in ways inconsistent with preferences means acting less than rationally, or indeed if inconsistent enough, irrationally. These assumptions have been applied to behavior in market situations and also increasingly to socially interdependent decision making [through game theory]. Based on a number of simple assumptions rational choice attempts to explain human behavior in terms of peoples’ tastes [preferences], beliefs [expectations of the success of different actions], and constraints upon their choice, including the choices made by other people. Rational choice [or analytical] Marxism uses these simplifying assumptions about individual human behavior to test and explain some of the key arguments of Marxist theory – including exploitation, class relations, and historical change. Rational choice Marxism argues that ‘some’ of the key features of Marxist analysis can be supported by logical reasoning or explained from the point of view of individual rational behavior [subject to constraints] rather than relying on structural analysis or dialectics.

Abstract

Rational choice theory [RCT] is the name given to an approach that seeks to explain human affairs by making certain simplifying assumptions about what motivates individual action. The assumption is that individuals have preferences toward things in the world [preferring apples to oranges or being altruistic to being selfish] and that they act in a consistent way, that is, they act as though they are trying to get the most of the things they prefer. Acting consistently in this way is known as being rational. Acting in ways inconsistent with preferences means acting less than rationally or indeed if inconsistent enough, irrationally. These assumptions have been applied to behavior in market situations and also increasingly to socially interdependent decision-making [through game theory]. Based on a number of simple assumptions, rational choice attempts to explain human behavior in terms of peoples' tastes [preferences], beliefs [expectations of the success of different actions], and constraints upon their choice, including the choices made by other people. Rational choice [or analytical] Marxism uses these simplifying assumptions about individual human behavior to test and explain some of the key arguments of Marxist theory—including exploitation, class relations, and historical change. Rational choice Marxism argues that “some” of the key features of Marxist analysis can be supported by logical reasoning or explained from the point of view of individual rational behavior [subject to constraints] rather than relying on structural analysis or dialectics.

Rational choice theory

Rational choice theory was first presented by Ronald V. Clarke and Derek B. Cornish in 1986 in The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending. As Tayler [1997, p. 293] states, the rationale behind the theory is that people will commit a crime if it is in their own best interests. Basically, the offender uses a decision-making process whereby the positive and negative aspects of committing a particular act are weighed. If the perception is that there are more reasons for proceeding, regardless of the existing security countermeasures, then, at the very least, an attempt will be made. If an opportunity presents itself, there is a benefit, and there is little likelihood of being apprehended, then they will commit the crime. Further, Pease [1997, p. 967] quotes Clarke and Cornish [1985], who claim “the underlying assumption is that offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal behavior. This entails making decisions and choices, however rudimentary their rationality might be, being constrained by limits of time, ability, and the availability of relevant information.”

Following this rationalization, it is up to the security practitioner to convince the potential offender that it is not in the offender’s best interests to carry out the act. The application of situational crime prevention techniques is the result of this theory. As rational choice is the theoretical element, what follows are situational crime prevention techniques that are the practical efforts used to reduce criminal opportunities. These techniques involve increasing the effort and the risk, reducing rewards and provocations, and removing excuses. These five techniques are further subdivided into five subcategories to help eliminate opportunities for criminals. They can range from physical access control devices to the use of psychology to deter people’s criminal tendencies. Finally, one should remember that criminal decision-making is crime specific. This means that “specific offenses bring particular benefits to offenders and are committed with specific motives in mind” [Cornish and Clarke, 2008, p. 26]. The weighed actions, risks, and rewards will be different for the laptop thief than for the arsonist, vandal, or industrial spy. In addition to these issues, even within the narrow confines of a single crime, such as laptop theft, what motivates one offender [e.g., financial desire] will be different from another [e.g., a drug addict who steals to trade for crack cocaine]. These situational crime prevention techniques are laid out in Table 19.1.

Table 19.1. Twenty-five techniques of situational prevention.

Source: Clarke, R.V. <//popcenter.org/library/25%20techniques%20grid.pdf> [accessed 07.06.09.].

Rational choice theory also includes the principle that criminals are opportunistic. These opportunistic criminals are not professionals, but average people. If the reward is high enough, deterrents will not work. People will weigh the pros and cons of committing the crime, and these are centered on the specifics of the target. Finally, situational crime prevention works best with the amateur criminal and least with the professional criminal. Bearing in mind that there are different classifications of criminals, primarily amateur criminal and professional, the more security precautions are taken, the more likely all but the most determined attacker will be stopped. Other factors come into play as well; two that will be discussed are displacement and diffusion of benefits.

7 Concluding Remarks

Rational choice theory is a diverse set of approaches to the study of society that are based in assumptions of individual rationality. Indeterminacies in such theory often mirror indeterminacies in social relations and individual understandings of these. Indeed, many rational choice explanations have demonstrated the indeterminacy of social choice. Among the most important contributions of such theorizing is the descriptive clarity it often adds to our understanding of issues that have been poorly characterized before. Rational choice explanation is inherently about states of affairs, although it can include in a state of affairs concerns for anything that motivates people. It is therefore easy to see how it fits with utilitarianism.

Rational choice value theories, when introduced into the study of law, have led to the burgeoning movement of law and economics, which has produced the most systematic analysis of the broad sweep of law and legal rules that legal scholarship and practice have hitherto seen. The quick march of that movement—roughly beginning with the Coase theorem [Coase 1988]—through virtually all areas of law has provoked counterattacks, but none of these is itself grounded in a value theory systematic enough to permit more than piecemeal objections. The Coase theorem says, with audacious generality and simplicity, that if there are no transaction costs to impede economic cooperation between owners of various resources, then ownership will not affect production, although it presumably will affect how the profits from the production are divided. That theorem, along with earlier work of Ronald Coase and many others, has led to the massive study of transaction costs.

We have a rich understanding of the problems of rational choice value theories just because those theories have been a major focus in the development and articulation of the entire discipline of economics. The theories are a product of centuries of determined and often brilliant debate with dozens of major contributions. Alternative value theories have had far too few advocates and critics to yield much understanding at all. Indeed, value claims commonly seem to be ad hoc and not systematically generalizable. Such considerations are no argument for the superiority or rightness of any value theory. But they may be a tonic for those who wonder how the only well-articulated class of value theories is so easy to criticize: It has enough content to be subject to extensive and varied criticism.