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Open Access
Peer-reviewed
Research Article
- Olivier Klein,
- Cora-Lise Pichon,
- Axel Cleeremans
Behavioral Priming: It's All in the Mind, but Whose Mind?
- Stéphane Doyen,
- Olivier Klein,
- Cora-Lise Pichon,
- Axel Cleeremans
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- Published: January 18, 2012
- //doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0029081
Figures
Abstract
The perspective that behavior is often driven by unconscious determinants has become widespread in social psychology. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows' [1996] famous study, in which participants unwittingly exposed to the stereotype of age walked slower when exiting the laboratory, was instrumental in defining this perspective. Here, we present two experiments aimed at replicating the original study. Despite the use of automated timing methods and a larger sample, our first experiment failed to show priming. Our second experiment was aimed at manipulating the beliefs of the experimenters: Half were led to think that participants would walk slower when primed congruently, and the other half was led to expect the opposite. Strikingly, we obtained a walking speed effect, but only when experimenters believed participants would indeed walk slower. This suggests that both priming and experimenters' expectations are instrumental in explaining the walking speed effect. Further, debriefing was suggestive of awareness of the primes. We conclude that unconscious behavioral priming is real, while real, involves mechanisms different from those typically assumed to cause the effect.
Citation: Doyen S, Klein O, Pichon C-L, Cleeremans A [2012] Behavioral Priming: It's All in the Mind, but Whose Mind? PLoS ONE 7[1]: e29081. //doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0029081
Editor: Jan Lauwereyns, Kyushu University, Japan
Received: July 20, 2011; Accepted: November 21, 2011; Published: January 18, 2012
Copyright: © 2012 Doyen et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by the Wienner-Anspach Foundation, the National Fund for Scientific Research [F.N.R.S. – F. R.S.] [Belgium], and by an institutional grant from the Université Libre de Bruxelles to Axel Cleeremans by Concerted Research Action 06/11-342 titled “Culturally Modified Organisms: What It Means to Be Human in the Age of Culture,” financed by the Ministère de la Communauté Française – Direction Générale l'Enseignement non obligatoire et de la Recherche scientifique [Belgium]. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: Behavioral priming has always been a controversial topic in social cognition. This paper highlights a more nuanced view of this topic, especially about its non-conscious nature, that might not please those in favor of a strict perspective. This does not alter the authors' adherence to all the PLoS ONE policies on sharing data and materials.
Introduction
In their seminal series of experiments, Bargh Chen and Burrows [1] demonstrated that activating a trait construct such as “being old” is sufficient to elicit behavioral effects in the absence of awareness. Bargh et al.'s demonstration involved asking participants to indicate which word was the odd one out amongst an ensemble of scrambled words a number of which, when rearranged, form a sentence. Unbeknownst to participants, the word left out of the sentence was systematically related to the concept of “being old”. The beauty of the experiment lies in its unusual dependent measure: walking speed. Those participants who had been exposed to words related to old age walked slower when exiting the laboratory than the participants who had not been so exposed. Further, the effect was claimed to occur without awareness, as participants were found not having noticed the link between exposure and their behavior [1]. This striking finding, now widely cited, established that priming may occur automatically and influence behavior with little or no awareness. It subsequently generated considerable further research in social psychology [2], [3], [4], [5].
Here, we sought to replicate Bargh et al's [1] experiments. This was motivated by three main reasons. The first is simply that the finding, influential as it is, was only replicated twice so far, with neither replication being exact. The first replication [6] required participants to rate the walking speed of a character drawn on a sheet of paper after they had been primed with extreme exemplars associated to the concept of “speed” [e.g.: cheetah vs. turtle]. The study found the expected priming effect. However, despite the fact that both this study and Bargh et al's share the same theoretical grounding, the latter only tells us of a bias in judgments of speed, as it did not require participants to actually perform any behavior. The second [7] replication aimed at refining Bargh et al's results by exploring the substantial variability exhibited by participants in their priming effect. The authors managed to replicate the results on walking speed, but the replication, like the original study, can be questioned based on imprecise timing methods [see below for a critical description].
Our second motivation was more conceptual. In social cognition, the assumption that high level semantic priming can occur automatically and outside of conscious awareness is almost taken for granted [8]. Yet, this assumption conflicts with evidences accumulated in cognitive neuroscience. For instance, several authors [9], [10], [11] suggest that two factors are necessary to produce the large patterns of neural activation in higher association cortices that are essential for semantic priming to occur: Top-down attention to the prime and bottom-up stimulus strength [e.g.: its saliency to the participants]. Such a pattern of activation can be the signature of semantic processing of the prime [12] and is typically associated with conscious awareness [13]. In Bargh et al.'s experiments 2a and 2b, however, neither of these features were present. Thus, in view of the semantic priming literature, the salience of a concept such as “being old” seems too weak to automatically prime a behavior that is further only indirectly related to old age [i.e., through the concept of slowness], in the absence of any contextual cues relevant to this trait. In Bargh et al.'s account, the association between the categorical prime [old age] and walking speed [a behavior] is mediated by the automatic activation a stereotypical trait [slowness].
The absence of conscious awareness of the relation between the prime and the behavior is considered as evidence that this activation is indeed automatic.
Our third motivation is methodological. Some aspects of Bargh et al.'s [1] experiment's 2a and 2b remain unspecified yet impinge on the interpretation of the results. In particular, we see three potential challenges with the methods of the original study:
First, in the original study, participants' walking speed was measured by a confederate posted in the hallway adjacent to the experiment room. The confederate was unaware of whether a participant had been primed or not. The purpose of this setup was to ensure that the experiment was following a double-blind principle. However, no such precautionary measures are reported concerning the experimenter who administered the task to the participants. Numerous studies, however, have indicated that the experimenter's expectations can influence participants' behavior [14] even in the most controlled experimental environments [15]. In Bargh et al.'s study, the experimenter who administered the task could thus very well have been aware of whether the participant was in the prime condition or not and tune his or her behavior accordingly. This possibility was in fact confirmed informally in our own study, as we found that it was very easy, even unintentionally, to discover the condition in which a particular participant takes part by giving a simple glimpse to the priming material. Experimenters could thus unwittingly have communicated their expectations to participants [16] and influenced their walking speed. Thus, given the fact that subtle cues can influence our behavior [17], controlling for the experimenter's expectations appears to be essential.
Second, walking speed was measured using a manual stopwatch — a method that is prone to error and bias. Manual chronometry requires extra precautions [7] which appear to be absent from the original study.
Third, after the experiments, participants were debriefed using the contingency funnel procedure [18], [19] so as to assess, through increasingly specific questions, [1] whether they were aware of the purpose of the study and [2] whether they were aware of the fact that the words used in the scrambled sentences task were related to the concept of old age. Only 1 out of 19 participants [1] [p.237] were found to be aware of the influence of the primes, — a finding that formed the basis for the claim that the effect of stereotype activation on behavior is unconscious. However, it remains unclear exactly what participants claimed to be unaware of. As Nisbett and Wilson [20] famously pointed out, participants can remain [1] unaware of the stimulus, [2] unaware of their response, or [3] unaware of the fact that the stimulus importantly influenced the response. Thus, we set out to improve on the tests of awareness originally used by Bargh et al. [1] in hopes of better delineating exactly what people were aware of in this situation.
In the following, we report on two studies aimed specifically at replicating the original findings while improving on its design and exploring the extent to which the experimenter's own expectancies may influence the results. In Experiment 1, we sought to replicate the original study but used automated rather than manual chronometry. In Experiment 2, we directly manipulated experimenters' expectancies by making half of the experimenters think their participants would slow down after exposure and the other half think that their participants would speed up after exposure.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants.
120 undergraduate Belgian French speaking students [age range 20–34 years of age, average 21.9] took part in Experiment 1. Four experimenters were recruited for this experiment [age range 21–24 years of age, average 22.5]. This experiment was a mandatory component of a practical course in psychology and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychological Sciences of the University of Brussels. Participants gave verbal informed consent to participate in this study, for which no particular written consent form was necessary, as they already had provided a general consent for the course to the Faculty of Psychology. This procedure was specifically approved by the Ethics Committee mentioned above.
Procedure and Design.
Participants were told that they had to take part in a test of their French linguistic skills.
The design replicated Bargh et al.'s [1] study and took place in an empty hallway located on a vacant floor of a Université Libre de Bruxelles building. The hallway, a long featureless corridor, led to the experimental room. Two infrared sensors were hidden in the hallway, separated by the same distance as in the original study [9.75 m]. The recording of the sensors signal was started before a participant arrived and was stopped upon full completion of all tasks. Participants were clearly directed to the end of the corridor to avoid any wandering and crossed each beam on each passage. There were two conditions defined by which version of the scrambled sentences task, the “Prime” and the “No-Prime” version, was used.
The Prime version consisted of 30 scrambled sentences [21] all including a word related to the concept of old age either directly translated from Bargh et al. [1] or adapted to French. To adapt the items, we conducted an online survey [80 participants] in which participants had to report 10 adjectives related to the concept of old age. Only the most frequent responses were used as replacement words. The word used as a prime could be put in a semantic context [e.g.: “always/worried/is/he/house/” for “he is always worried”] or not [e.g.: “piece/grey/of/Friday/fabric/a” for “a piece of grey fabric”]. To complete the task, participants had to rearrange 30 scrambled sentences consisting of 4 to 5 words in the correct order and cross out the word that would not fit in the sentence [see supporting material S1 for a complete list of stimuli]. There was no time limit to complete the task.
The No-Prime version of the task was exactly identical to the Prime version except that each word related to the concept of old age was replaced by a neutral word.
Participants were randomly and blindly assigned to either the Prime or the No-Prime condition. Experimenters were randomly recruited among students and had neither prior expectations toward participants behavior nor knowledge of the original experiment [1]. Each experimenter randomly tested participants from both conditions and was instructed to interact with each participant according to a strict script so that their potential influence was minimized. Experimenters remained in the room throughout the whole task. The questionnaires were enclosed in an envelope that the participant had to open, so as to keep each experimenter blind to the participant's condition. Upon completion of the scrambled sentences task, participants were thanked and dismissed. They then walked towards the exit through the hallway. In doing so, they triggered the infrared beams and their walking speed was subsequently computed.
Before reaching the exit, participants were called back by the experimenter who pretended that he/she had forgotten to administer a final task. The debriefing that followed relied on a funnel questionnaire [1], [18] assessing participants' awareness of the manipulation on three levels:
- 1-Awareness of the prime was assessed by asking participants increasingly specific questions about the presence of primes in the scrambled sentences. One particular question was a four-alternative forced-choice task [4-AFC] in which participants were required to choose between four pictures representing four social categories that could have been used as primes [i.e.: athletic person, Arabic person, handicapped person and elderly].
- 2-Awareness of the primed behavior was assessed by inviting participants to indicate how much they thought their walking speed had increased or decreased relative to their regular walking speed [responses were provided using an on-screen slider along a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 50 representing their regular walking speed].
- 3-Awareness of the link between the prime and the primed behavior was assessed directly by asking participants whether they had noticed any link between the scrambled sentences task and their walking speed as they had left the room.
The debriefing was also used to probe suspicion regarding the purpose of the experiment by asking increasingly accurate questions such as: “Do you think this experiment is related to any topic in particular?”, “Do you think this experiment could be related with manipulating behavior?”.
Results
Walking speed.
In this analysis, we used participants' walking speed as they entered the experiment room, [i.e., before priming] as a covariate. The results show no significant difference between the Prime [M = 6.27″ SD = 2.15] and the No-Prime group [M = 6.39″ SD = 1.11] in the time necessary to walk along the hallway after the priming manipulation [F [1, 119]